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Human beings are one of the great success stories of evolution. They have spread over 
the globe and refashioned much of it to their own convenience. What has made this 
possible? Perhaps there is no one key which alone explains why humans have come to 
dominate nature. But a crucial part has surely been played by our high potential for 
theoretical rationality. Human beings far surpass other animals in their ability to form 
accurate beliefs across a wide range of topics, and many aspects of human civilization 
rest on this accomplishment. My aim in this paper will be to explain this ability from 
an evolutionary perspective. I want to understand how beings with our biological 
history came to be so good at theoretical rationality. 
1 Introduction
The claim that humans are good at theoretical rationality is not entirely 
uncontroversial. Much recent psychological research suggests that humans are far less 
good at forming accurate beliefs than you might initially suppose. I shall discuss this 
research at some length below. It raises many interesting issues, and will force me to 
be more specific about the precise sense in which humans possess a high level of 
theoretical rationality. But this research does not in the end undermine the claim that 
humans do have a high degree of theoretical rationality, nor that this has played an 
important role in human development. 
Evolutionary explanations do not always account for traits in terms of selective 
advantages they provide. Some biological traits have not been selected because of 
their effects. Rather they are by-products of other traits which have been so selected. 
They do not serve any function themselves, but have been carried along by different 
traits that do yield advantages. Such evolutionary side-effects are "spandrels", in the 
sense made familiar by Stephen Jay Gould (Gould and Lewontin, 1979). 
My explanation of human theoretical rationality will in the first instance be spandrel-
like. I shall not explain theoretical rationality directly. Instead I shall argue that it 
piggy-backs on other traits. In particular, I shall argue that it piggy-backs on the 
evolution of cognitive abilities for "understanding of mind" and for means-end 
thinking. I shall argue that once these other abilities are in place, then nothing more is 
needed for humans to achieve high levels of theoretical rationality. 
However, at the end I shall add a twist. Even if theoretical rationality didn't initially 
arise because of its biological advantages, there seems little doubt that it does provide 
such advantages. Given this, we would expect it to be encouraged by natural selection, 
even if it wasn't natural selection that made it available in the first place. So maybe 
there have been biological adaptations for aquiring knowledge, so to speak, alongside 
the other cognitive adaptations bequeathed to us by natural selection. I shall explore 
this thought at the end of this paper, not only for the light it throws on theoretical 
rationality itself, but because it seems to me to point to some general morals about the 
evolution of human cognition. 
I shall approach these issues via a discussion of the "rationality debate" in 
contemporary psychology. As I said, the claim that human beings display high levels 
of theoretical rationality is not as straightforward as it may seem, since there is now a 
good deal of evidence that human beings are in fact suprisingly prone to theoretical 
irrationality. Subjects in a well-known series of psychological experiments tend to 
produce highly inaccurate answers in many situations where we might expect them to 
do better. 
In the next section I shall point out that these experimental data raise two immediate 
problems. First, there is an evaluative problem about the status of our standards of 
rationality. Second, there is the explanatory problem of how humans are capable of 
adherence to such standards. 
The following two sections, 3 and 4, will be devoted to the evaluative problem. In the 
end there is nothing terribly deep here, but a lot of confusing undergrowth needs to be 
cleared away. Once this has been done, then an obvious answer to the explanatory 
issue will become apparent, and accordingly in section 5 I shall account for the ability 
of humans to achieve high levels of theoretical rationality, the experimental data 
notwithstanding. 
In sections 6-10 I shall place this answer to the explanatory problem in an 
evolutionary context. I shall show how my answer assumes that theoretical rationality 
is a by-product of two other intellectual abilities which we have independent reason to 
regard as evolutionarily explicable, namely, understanding of mind and means-end 
thinking. The final section 11 will then explore the possibility that natural selection 
may also have fostered theoretical rationality directly, and given us certain inborn 
inclinations to seek out true beliefs as such. 
A terminological simplification. Theoretical rationality, the rationality of the beliefs 
you adopt, contrasts with practical rationality, the rationality of the choices you 
subsequently make. Since I shall be focusing on theoretical rationality for the next 
few sections, it will be helpful to drop the "theoretical" for now, and refer to 
"rationality" simpliciter. When I do discuss practical rationality later in the paper, I 
shall make the distinction explicit. 
2 Widespread Irrationality
Consider these three famous puzzles. 
(1) Linda studied sociology at the London School of Economics. She reads the 
Guardian, is a member of the Labour Party, and enjoys experimental theatre. Which 
of these is more probable? (A) Linda is a bank teller. (B) Linda is a bank teller and an 
active feminist. 
(2) You are worried that you have a not uncommon form of cancer. (It is present in 
1% of people like you.) There is a simple and effective test, which identifies the 
cancer in everyone who has it, and only gives a false positive result in 10% of people 
without it. You take the test, and get a positive result. What is now the probability you 
have the cancer? (A) 90% (B) 9% (C) 50% (D) 89%. 
(3) A pack of cards each has a letter on one side and a number on the other. The 
following four are dealt one side up. Which cards should you turn over to test whether 
every vowel has an even number on the other side?
|t| |4| |3| |e|
Most people are terrible at these problems. There is now a huge amount of 
experimental data showing that only a small minority give the appropriate answers in 
tests of these kinds. (The appropriate answer in (1) is (A): a conjunction cannot be 
more probable than its conjuncts. In (2) it is (B). In (3) it is |e| and |3|(1). For two 
useful surveys of such studies, see Evans and Over, 1996, and Stein, 1996.) 
Of course, many questions can be raised about the interpretation of experiments like 
these, and we shall raise some of them below. However, let us assume for the moment 
that these experiments do point to widespread deficiencies in human theoretical 
rationality. Two obvious questions then arise. 
(A) The Evaluative Question. What is the status of the normative standards according
to which some judgements and inferences are rational, and others not? One natural 
answer would be that these normative standards are a distillation of our best intuitions 
about rationality. On this view, a set of normative principles about rationality should 
be viewed as a kind of theory, a theory whose job is to accommodate as many as 
possible of our basic intuitions about rationality. However, this answer seems to be in 
tension with the experimental data, since these data suggest that the intuitions of 
ordinary people diverge markedly from orthodox standards of normative rationality. 
So, if we take the experimental data at face value, then we will need a different 
account of the source of these orthodox standards of normative rationality, an account 
which will make room for everyday intuitions to diverge from those standards. 
(B) The Explanatory Question. A further puzzle is that many human activities seem to 
improve on the dismal performances in the psychological experiments. As it is often 
put, "If we're so dumb, how come we sent a man to the moon?" The experimental data 
suggest that most people are irrational much of the time. But if this is right, then we 
need some further account of how these limitations are transcended in those many 
modern human institutions that seem to rely on a high degree of accuracy and 
precision. 
3 The Evaluative Question
Let me begin with the evaluative question. One possible line of attack is to argue that 
the experimental data should not be taken at face value. Perhaps the intuitive 
judgements of ordinary people do not stray as far from orthodox assumptions about 
normative rationality as the experiments at first suggest. If so, then perhaps we can 
equate standards of rationality with the intuitions of ordinary people after all. 
L. Johnathan Cohen, for example, has argued that, if we pay due attention to the 
distinction between intellectual competence and performance, then the apparent gap 
between ordinary practice and real standards can be made to disappear. "Competence" 
here refers to underlying capacities, to basic reasoning procedures. "Performance" 
refers to actual behaviour, which might not reflect competence for any number of 
reasons, such as momentary inattention, forgetfulness, drunkenness, or indeed the 
distractions of undergoing a psychological experiment. Once we make this distinction, 
then it is possible to argue, as Cohen indeed does, that, while the performance of 
ordinary people often deviates from normative standards of rationality, the match 
between ordinary intuitions and normative standards is restored at the level of 
competence (Cohen, 1981.) 
Indeed, argues Cohen, how could it be otherwise, given that our normative theory 
must in the end answer to our best intuitions about the right way to judge and reason?
Since our judgemental behaviour will also be guided by these intuitions (when 
inattention, drink, or strange experimental settings do not intrude), there is no real 
room for a mismatch. Our underlying competence cannot fail to conform to our 
normative theory. 
Cohen's position might seem plausible, but it has some odd consequences. Imagine 
that human beings really were incompetent in the ways sugested by the above 
experiments. That is, suppose that their underlying intellectual capacities, and not just 
failures of performance, made them take some conjunctions to be more probable than 
their conjuncts; and similarly to commit the "base rate fallacy" of ignoring the prior 
probability of some event when considering the relevance of new information; and, 
again, to fail to see that possible counter-examples are more informative about a 
putative generalization than positive instances. Now, if humans really were like this, 
would different standards of rationality then hold, would it then be rational to judge 
conjunctions more probable than their conjuncts, and so on? Surely not. Standards of 
rationality are not relative in this way. It is an objective matter whether or not a given 
intellectual move is rational, quite indepent of whether people intuitively take it to be 
rational. Yet is difficult to see how Cohen can avoid making rationality such a relative 
matter. If people did think as just hypothesized, then the theory that their thinking was 
rational would fit their intitions about rationality perfectly, and so, by Cohen's 
argument, be fully vindicated. 
This thought-experiment (adapted from Stich, 19??) bears directly on the 
interpretation of the actual experimental data. If it is possible for the underlying 
intellectual competence of human beings to incline them to irrationality, then surely 
the best explanation of the actual performance of human beings is that they have just 
such an irrational intellectual competence (2) . The experimental data indicate that 
human beings behave like the community in the thought experiment. So, in the 
absence of special arguments to the contrary, the obvious conclusion is that the basic 
intellectual inclinations of ordinary humans are indeed irrational (3). 
This now returns us to the evaluative problem. If the ordinary intuitions of ordinary 
people don't support objective standards of rationality, then what is the status of those 
standards? What makes it right to reason in certain ways, even when reasoning in 
those ways seems unnatural to most people? 
I would like to explore a very simple answer to this question. Suppose we say that a 
method of reasoning is rational to the extent it issues in true beliefs. (4) If we adopt 
this view, then there is no difficulty at all in understanding how the normal practice 
and intuitions of most people can be irrational. It is just a matter of their reasoning in 
ways which characteristically give rise to false beliefs (such as judging probabilities 
by reference to stereotypes, as in the Linda experiment, or ignoring base rates, as in 
the probability-of-cancer experiment, or failing to seek out possible counter-examples, 
as in the card-selection experiment). 
This move is related to the "reliabilist" strategy in epistemology. "Reliable" in this 
context means "a reliable source of true beliefs", and reliabilists in epistemology 
argue that the notion of knowledge is best analyzed as "true belief issuing from some 
reliable method". Some, but not all, reliabilists go further, and also analyze the 
notions of justified belief, and of a rational mode of thought, in terms of belief-
forming methods which are reliable-for-truth. Now, there is a widespread debate 
about whether this reliabilist approach fully captures all aspects of the notion of 
knowledge, and a fortiori whether it is adequate to the further notions of justification 
and rationality. However, I shall not enter into these debates here, though many of the 
points made below will be relevant to them. Rather, my aim will merely be to show 
that if we adopt a reliabilist approach to rationality, then we can easily deal with the 
evaluative and explanatory problems generated by the experimental data on irrational 
human performance. I certainly think this lends support to a reliabilist approach to 
rationality (and to justification and knowledge). Whether other objections face the 
reliabilist programme in epistemology lies beyond the scope of this paper. 
A common first reaction to my reliabilist suggestion is that it cannot really help. For 
what does it mean to say that a belief is "true", so the worry goes, other than that it is 
reachable by methods of rational thought? Given this, my reliabilist suggestion would 
seem to collapse into the empty claim that a method of thought is rational if it yields 
answers which are reachable by methods of rational thought. 
I agree this would follow if "true" means something like "rationally assertible". 
However, I think this is the wrong analysis of truth. I take it that truth can be analysed 
independently of any such notion as "rational" (and thus can be used to analyse 
rationality in turn, as in my suggested reliabilist account). These are of course matters 
of active controversy. My view, that truth can be analysed first, before we come to 
questions of rational assertibility, would certainly be resisted, inter alia, by neo-
pragmatists like Hilary Putnam, by neo-verificationists influenced by Michael 
Dummett, and by the followers of Donald Davidson. There is no question of entering 
into this debate in this paper. I have written about the issue elsewhere (Papineau, 1987; 
1993, ch 3; 1999). Here I can only invite readers to take my attitude to truth on trust, 
and note how naturally it allows us to deal with the irrationality debate. 
4 More on the Evaluative Question
4.1 Further Desiderata on Modes of Thought
I have suggested that we should equate the theoretical rationality of modes of thought 
with their reliability-for-truth. In effect this is to treat "theoretical rationality" as a 
consequentialist notion. We deem a mode of thought to be rational to the extent that it 
is an effective means to the consequence of true beliefs. 
Given this, however, an obvious further objection suggests itself. Why privilege truth 
as the only consequence that is relevant to the evaluation of belief-forming processes? 
There are a number of other consequences that might also be thought to matter. Most 
obviously, it will normally also be desirable that our belief-forming methods are 
significant, in the sense of delivering informative beliefs on matters of concern, and 
frugal, in the sense of not using large amounts of time or other resources. And we can 
imagine other dimensions of possible consequentialist evaluation of belief-forming 
methods, to do with whether they deliver beliefs that will make you rich, say, or are 
consistent with traditional values, or indeed pretty much anything, depending on who 
is doing the evaluating. To equate rationality specifically with reliability for truth 
would thus seem arbitrarily to privilege one dimension of theoretical rationality over 
others. 
I don't think there is any substantial issue here. I agree that methods of belief-
formation can be evaluated in all kinds of consequentialist ways. Moreover, I am 
happy to concede that reliability for truth is just one among these possibilities. While I 
think that truth is generally important for human beings, for various reasons, to which 
I shall return in my final section, I certainly do not want to argue that it the only 
consequence of belief-forming methods which can be given evaluative significance. 
Indeed it is hard to imagine a realistic human perspective which ignores all other 
dimensions of possible evaluation in favour of truth. In particular, it is hard to imagine 
a realistic perspective that ignores significance and frugality. While we indeed 
normally want to avoid error by having methods which are highly reliable-for-truth, 
we won't want to do this by restricting our beliefs to trivial and easily decidable 
matters, or by always spending inordinate amounts of time making sure our answers 
are correct. From any pragmatically realistic point of view, there wouldn't be much 
point in high levels of reliability, if this meant that we never got information on 
matters that mattered to our plans, or only received it after the time for action was past. 
Given these points, it will be helpful to refine our notion of theoretical rationality. Let 
us distinguish "epistemic rationality" from "wide theoretical rationality". I shall say 
that a belief-forming method is "epistemically rational" to the extent it is specifically 
reliable-for-truth, and that it has "wide theoretical rationality" to the extent it produces 
an optimal mix of all the different desiderata imposed on it. I have no views about 
what this wide range of desiderata should be, and am happy to allow that different 
people with different interests may properly be concerned with different desiderata. In 
particular, therefore, I make no assumption that epistemic rationality is always more 
important than other aspects of wide theoretical rationality, nor that it should always 
be given any special weight in constructing an "optimal mix" of different desiderata. 
Having said all this, however, it is worth noting that "epistemically rational" is not 
simply a term of art of my own construction, but is a component in such everyday 
notions as "knowledge" and "justified belief". These everyday notions do focus 
exclusively on reliability to the exclusion of other desiderata. In particular, while 
frugality and significance are unquestionably significant aspects of our belief-forming 
methods, by anybody's standards, they are ignored by everyday epistemological 
notions like "knowledge" and "justified belief" 
To see that these everyday notions concern themselves only with reliability, and 
abstract from further considerations of economy and importance, imagine a man who 
spends a month counting the individual blades of grass in his garden. We will no 
doubt feel this is a complete waste of time, and that the conclusion is of no possible 
interest to anyone, yet we will not say on this account that he does not know how 
many blades of grass there are, not that his belief in their number is not justified. 
For the moment I offer this as no more than a terminological point. It is simply a fact 
about our language that we have words ("knowledge", "justified") that we use to 
assess the sources of our beliefs purely from the perspective of reliability for truth, 
and in abstraction from such issues as significance and frugality. This linguistic fact 
does nothing to show that reliability-for-truth is somehow more basic or significant 
than these other desiderata, nor indeed is this something I believe. But I do take this 
linguistic fact to point to something interesting about our cogntive economy, and I 
shall return to the point in my final section. 
4.2 Perhaps Human are (Widely) Rational After All
In section 3 I addressed the question of how far the data from psychological 
experiments show that ordinary people are "irrational". This question is complicated 
by the existence of further desiderata on belief-forming methods in addition to 
reliability-for-truth. Perhaps the allegedly poor performance of ordinary subjects in 
the psychological experiments is due to their using methods of belief-formation that 
sacrifice some degree of reliability-for-truth for further desiderata like significance 
and frugality. It is obvious enough that these futher desiderata are in some tension 
with reliability, and indeed with each other, and that sensible belief-forming strategies 
will therefore aim to achieve some optimal balance between them. In particular they 
will generally trade in some degree of reliability-for-truth in the hope of gaining 
significant information while remaining frugal. 
Given that such a trade-off is clearly a sensible strategy for dealing with the world in
general, it would seem unreasonable immediately to condemn ordinary thinkers as 
"irrational" just because they are using methods whose less-than-ideal reliability-for-
truth is highlighted by the psychological experiments. Maybe their methods of 
thought characterictically give false answers in these settings, but this doesn't show 
that they don't embody an optimal mix of relaibility, significance, economy, and other 
desiderata. In the terms introduced above, maybe ordinary people are "widely 
theoretically rational", even if not "epistemically rational". 
This is a reasonable point, but even so I have my doubts about whether ordinary 
methods of thought are "rational" even in this "wide" sense of yielding an optimal mix 
of reliability with other desiderata. It does not seem hard to imagine modes of thought 
which would get the right answers to the experimental puzzles, without sacrificing 
anything of frugality or significance across the board. However, I shall not press this 
point here, since there seems no principled basis for deciding how to weigh the 
ingredients in the optimal mix of reliability and other desiderata on belief-forming 
methods, and in any case the issue is of no importance to any of the questions we are 
interested in. 
To see that it doesn't really matter whether or not we end up calling ordinary people 
"rational", note first that all my suggestions for evaluating belief-forming methods 
remain independent of whether actual human practice conforms to these evaluations. 
This is because the notions of "epistemic rationality" and "wide theoretical 
rationality" are both consequentialist notions. They both evaluate belief-forming 
methods in terms of whether they actually deliver certain results, be this truth alone, 
or some mixture of truth and and other requirements. So whether a method is rational, 
in either of these consequentialist senses, is quite independent of whether ordinary 
people intutively judge it to be rational, or whether they are naturally inclined to use it.
(6)
Note also that the explanatory problem will remain a problem even if (which I am 
inclined to doubt) the practice of ordinary people is "rational" in the wide sense that it 
optimises a mix of reliability, frugality, significance, and so on. For the psychological 
experiments certainly show that most people are bad in the specific dimension of 
reliability-for-truth, in that they characteristically give incorrect answers to the 
experimental puzzles. Maybe it is true that their high error rate in these situations is a 
necessary by-product of their modes of thought satisfying other sensible desiderata. 
But it is still a high error rate. So there is still a puzzle about how these imperfections 
in reliability are transcended in certain contexts, such as sending a man to the moon, 
where it is crucial that the kinds of mistakes made in the psychological experiments 
should somehow be avoided. 
4.3 Human Thought is Suited to the Environment of Evolutionary Adaptation
There is a yet further dimension to assessments of rationality. As some of the above 
remarks may already have suggested, assessments of rationality are crucially sensitive 
to the range of environments against which modes of thought are assessed. A mode of 
thought that scores badly within one range of contexts may do well within another. 
Note that this means that there is another way in which the performance of ordinary 
people can be defended against aspersions cast on their "rationality". In addition to the 
point that they may be sacrificing reliability-for-truth in favour of increased 
significance, frugality, and so on, there is also the defence that they may score much 
better, on both epistemic and wide theoretical rationality, if they are evaluated against 
a range of environments to which their abilities are well-suited. Maybe ordinary 
people can be made to look stupid in the specific setting of the psychological 
laboratory. But it does not follow that their intellectual performance will be poor 
across a different range of enivironments, and in particular across the range of 
environments in which they normally find themselves. 
This point had been stressed by those writing within the tradition of recent 
"evolutionary psychology". These evolutionary writers have set themselves against 
the standard psychological understanding of the experimental data on irrationality. 
This standard response has come to be known as the "heuristics and biases" approach, 
and explains the data by arguing that humans adopt certain heuristic strategies in 
solving theoretical problems, strategies which often provide useful short-cuts to 
reasonably accurate answers, but can be experimentally demonstrated to bias subjects 
irrationally towards certain kinds of mistakes (Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky, 1982). 
Against this, the evolutionary psychologists (see Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby, 1992) 
argue that our characteristic modes of thought must necessarily be well-suited to the 
range of environments in which they were originally selected. In this sense, they 
argue, our modes of thought cannot help but be "rational", even if they go astray when 
forced to work in unnatural contemporary environments, including those of 
contemporary psychological experiments. This thought is normally presented in 
tandem with the evolutionary psychologists' picture of the human mind as a "Swiss 
Army Knife", containing a number of self-contained and hard-wired "modules" each 
designed for a specific cognitive task, such as visually identifying physical objects, 
thinking about other minds, selecting suitable mates, enforcing social contracts, and 
so on. Since these modules have been developed by natural selection over the last five 
million years, argue the evolutionary psychologists, we should expect them to be good 
at satisfying the important desiderata, not across all imaginable contexts, it is true, but 
specifically in the "environment of evolutionary adaptation", in the range of contexts 
in which they were evolved by natural selection. (7)
An initial reservation about this evolutionary argument is that it assumes that natural 
selection always delivers optimal designs. This is simply not true, if for no other 
reason than that natural selection never designs things from scratch, but must build on 
structures already in place. (Thus, for example, the involvement of the emotions in 
cognition arguably derives from their role in the reptilian brain, and may well have 
constrained modern cognition in distinctly sub-optimal directions.) 
But suppose we let this point pass. A more significant observation is that there is far 
less distance between the evolutionary psychologists and their opponents in the 
"heuristics and biases" tradition than might at first appear (cf. Samuels, Stich and 
Bishop, forthcoming). After all, both sides agree that the apparently poor 
performances in the psychological experiments are due to people using "quick and 
dirty" cognitive techniques, which may work pretty well in some range of contexts, 
but which fail in the experiments. And there seems no reason why those in the 
"heuristics and biases" tradition should not accept the suggestion that these "quick and 
dirty" techniques are in fact evolved modules, the neural underpinnings for whch have 
been fostered by natural selection in the environment of evolutionary adapatation. 
The only remaining issue is then whether all this shows that humans are "irrational" or 
not. And here too there seems no substantial matter for disagreement. Both sides can 
agree that our modes of thought must have worked reasonably well in the range of 
environments where they were originally developed by natural selection. Maybe they 
aren't the best of all possible modes of thought, even in those environments, given that 
natural selection is often hampered by the blueprints it inherits from earlier stages of 
evolution. But they must have produced the goods often enough when it mattered, 
otherwise they wouldn't have been favoured by natural selection at all. 
Similarly, on the other side, both sides can agree that our modes of thought fail in a 
wide range of modern environments. This is the inference that is normally drawn from 
the psychological experiments by those in the "heuristics and biases" tradition. 
Sometimes it seems as if the evolutionary psychologists wish to deny this inference, 
in so far as they aim to defend "human rationality" against the doubts widely thought 
to be cast on it by the experimental data. But on closer examination this impression 
dissolves. For, after all, the evolutionary psychologists defend human modes of 
thought by insisting that they must at least have worked well in the environment of 
evolutionary adaptation, even if they break down in modern environments. This shift 
of evaluative context, from the modern environment to the evolutionary one, would 
not be necessary if our modes of thought worked equally well in both, and so 
implicitly concedes that our biologically natural modes of thought do not work 
optimally in a wide range of modern situations. 
5 The Explanatory Question
This now brings us back to the explanatory question. If it is agreed on all sides that 
human thinking depends on "quick and dirty" problem-solving strategies which often 
go astray in modern environments, then how are we humans able to succeed in 
enterprises that demand a high level of accuracy across just such modern contexts? Or, 
as I put it before, "If we're so dumb, how come we sent a man to the moon?" 
The discussion so far suggests an natural answer to the explanatory question. As a 
preliminary to this answer, note that some people are better at the puzzles in the 
psychological experiments than others. In particular, I would expect those of my 
readers who had met versions of these puzzles before, and who understand their 
workings, to have had no great difficulty in avoiding the wrong answers. 
I am not suggesting here that some people are innately smarter than others. On the 
contrary, my point is that nearly all humans are quite capable of improving their 
performance in such puzzles, if they prepare themselves appropriately. And the 
appropriate preparation is obvious enough. We can simply set ourselves to be more 
reliable sources of true belief. That is, we can identify and analyse different kinds of 
problem situation, figure out which methods of belief-formation will actually deliver 
true answers in those situations, and then set ourselves to practice these reliable 
methods. In this way we can "transcend" the "quick and dirty" modes of thought 
bequeathed to us by evolution. These "heuristics" or "modules" may work fine in a 
certain range of situations, or when speed is of the essence, but we can do much better
when we want to make sure that we get the right answers, and are prepared to expend 
a significant amount of intellectual time and energy in finding them. 
Thus some of us have learned to deal with the puzzles given above by applying the 
principles of the probability calculus and propositional logic. We "calculate" the 
answers in accord with such principles, rather than relying on our intuitive sense of 
the right answer, precisely because we have learned that our intuitive judgements are 
an unreliable guide to the truth, and because we know that reasoning in line with the 
probability calculus and propositional logic is guaranteed to track the truth. (8)
I would be prepared to argue that this ability, to identify and deliberately adopt 
reliable methods of belief formation, has played a huge part in the development of 
human civilization. Of course, it is not the only factor that separates us from other 
apes, and indeed I shall argue below that this deliberate pursuit of reliability rests on a 
number of further abilities which may also be peculiar to humans. But at the same 
time it is clear that a wide range of advances in civilization are simply special cases of 
the strategy of deliberately adopting methods designed to increase knowledge and 
eliminate error. Those ancient astronomers who first kept accurate records did so 
because they could see that this would enable them to avoid false beliefs about past 
events, and the same goes for every other kind of system of written records. Voyages 
of exploration, by their nature, are explicitly designed to gather accurate information 
that would otherwise be unavailable. The elaborate procedures adopted in courts of 
law and similar formal investigations have the overt function of minimizing any 
chance of false verdicts. Arithmetic, geometry, double-entry bookkeeping, mechanical 
calculating devices, and so on, are all at bottom simply elaborate instruments invented 
in order to allow us to reach accurate conclusions on matters whch would otherwise 
be left to guesswork. (9)
Not everybody whose belief-forming strategies are improved by human civilization 
need themselves have reflected on the advantages of these improvements. Once a 
certain technique, such as long division, or logarithms, or indeed the use of 
mechanical calculators, has been designed by innovative individuals, in the interests 
of improved reliability for truth, then others can be trained in these techniques, 
without themselves necessarily appreciating their rationale. We humans have 
widespread institutions designed in large part for just this purpose -- namely, schools 
and universities. Of course, it is to be hoped that many students will not only master 
the techniques, but also come in time to understand why they are good routes to the 
right answers. But this ideal is not always achieved (there are plenty of people who 
can use calculators, and indeed logarithms, without understanding how they work), 
and even when it is, it is normally only after at least some techinques have first been 
instilled by rote. 
6 Transcending Nature: The End of Truth and the Means to Achieve It
From a biological perspective, the argument of the last section may seem only to have 
pushed the explanatory problem back. The explanatory problem was to understand 
how we can do such clever things as send a man to the moon, given the limitations of 
our biologically natural "quick and dirty" modes of thought. My answer has been, in 
effect, that we can do another clever thing, namely, deliberately identify ways of 
thinking that are reliable for truth and set ourselves to practice them. But now it could 
reasonably be complained that I owe a further explanation, of how we can do this 
further clever thing, given our biological limitations. ("If we're so dumb, how come 
we can deliberately choose ways of thinking that are reliable for truth?") 
This is an entirely reasonable challenge. I certainly don't want to argue that our ability 
deliberately to seek out the truth somehow requires us to transcend our biological 
natures. Fortunately, this is not necessary. We can indeed transcend the limitations of 
our innate "quick and dirty" methods. But this doesn't depend on some non-biological 
part of our beings. Instead we use other abilities bequeathed to us by biological 
evolution to correct any failings in our innate belief-forming routines. 
At first pass, two simple abilities would seem to suffice for the enterprise of 
deliberately seeking out reliable belief-forming methods. First, humans need to be 
able to identify the end of truth. Second, they need to figure out how to achieve it. 
After all, what are reliable belief-forming methods, except an effective means to the 
end of truth? 
It may seem that the first of these sub-abilities -- namely, identifying the end of truth -
- will present the bigger hurdle from a biological-evolutionary perspective. Surely, 
you may feel, it would beg all the interesting evolutionary questions simply to credit 
our ancestors with a grasp of a sophisticated notion like truth. On the other hand, if 
only our ancestors had been able to identify the end of truth, then wouldn't it be easy 
to explain how they figured out how to achieve it? For couldn't they simply have used 
general means-end reasoning to work out which means are an effective route to the 
aim of truth? 
However, it is arguable that this may have things the wrong way round. Recent work 
on cognitive evolution suggests that acquiring a notion of truth may have been the 
easy part for our ancestors, by comparison with their identifying the best means to this 
end. This is because the notion of truth falls out of "understanding of mind", and there 
is plenty of independent reason to suppose that our ancestors evolved such an 
understanding of mind. By contrast, the issue of means-end thinking is not at all 
straightforward, and it not clear when, and in what sense, our ancestors acquired a 
general ability to identify effective means to given ends. 
I shall consider these two topics in turn. First, in the next section, I shall make some 
remarks about theory of mind. Then, in the following two sections, 8-9, I shall turn to 
means-end reasoning. 
This latter will prove a large and unwieldy topic, and I will have to cut many corners. 
Still, it will be helpful to make some general comments, not least because it will cast 
some further light on my suggested solution to the explanatory problem. In particular, 
it will help us better to understand the way in which the deliberate pursuit of truth can 
co-exist with the older "quick and dirty" belief-forming routines. This point will be 
discussed in section 10. 
The final section 11 then considers the possibility that the deliberate pursuit of truth 
may not only be a spin-off from understanding of mind and means-end reasoning, but 
may itself be a biological adaptation. 
7 Understanding of Mind
The striking ability of humans to attribute a wide range of mental states to each other, 
and to use this to predict and explain behaviour, has been intensively discussed in 
recent years by philosophers and psychologists (Davies and Stone, 1995a and 1995b; 
Carruthers and Smith, 1996). However, the right analysis of this "understanding of 
mind" is still a controversial matter, and it would be foolhardy for me to try and 
defend any agreed position here. 
One popular contemporary view goes as follows. Normal adult humans have a "theory
of mind", which allows them to reason about beliefs, desires and other "common-
sense" mental states, and moreover this theory resides in a "module" which has been 
selected in the course of human evolution because of the specific advantages which 
derived from facility with psychological reasoning. 
However, some dissenters doubt whether human understanding of mind consists in 
anything like a "theory"; instead, they argue, it derives largely from our ability to 
simulate other human beings by running certain mental processes "off-line". A further 
question is whether understanding of mind is acquired during individual development 
via some more general learning ability, rather than from genes selected specifically to 
facilitate understanding of mind. 
Fortunately, these intricacies are orthogonal to my concerns here. All that matters for 
present purposes is that at some point in evolutionary history all normal humans came 
to have an ability to think about each others' mental states. We can ignore such further 
questions as whether this understanding was itself an adaptation, or derived from 
some more general learning ability, or whether it required a "theory", as opposed to 
simulation. 
The important point here is that any being who has an understanding of mind, in any 
of these senses, will inevitably have a working grasp of the difference between true 
and false belief. To see this, recall that the diagnostic evidence for full possession of 
understanding of mind is the ability to pass the "false belief test". In this test, the 
experimenter tells a subject the following story. "Sally puts her sweets in the basket. 
While Sally is out of the room her mother puts them in the drawer." The experimenter 
then asks the subject, "When Sally comes back, where will Sally look for her sweets?" 
If the subject has full-fledged understanding of mind, the subject will be able to 
answer that Sally will look in the basket. Even though the sweets are really in the 
drawer, subjects with an understanding of mind will know that Sally's actions are 
guided by her beliefs about world, not by the world itself, and moreover that beliefs 
can represent the world as other than it is, as with Sally's belief about where the 
sweets are. There is now fairly clear-cut evidence that all normal human children 
acquire the ability to pass the false belief test between the ages of three and four, but 
not before. By comparison, animals other than apes are clearly incapable of passing 
the false belief test, while the situation with chimpanzees and other apes is obscure, 
not least because the experiment is very difficult to conduct if you can't talk to the 
subjects, and the results obtained with apes are therefore open to different 
interpretations. 
Let us leave the chimpanzees and other apes to one side, and concentrate on the fact 
that, at some stage in evolutionary history, normal humans became cognitively 
sophisticated enough to pass the false belief test. Once humans could pass the false 
belief test, they would willy-nilly have been able to distinguish between true and false 
belief. They would have been able to think that Sally believes the sweets are in the 
basket, when they are not, and contrast that with the situation where she believes them 
to be in the basket, and they are. This would seem enough for them to be able to 
identify the end of true belief ("I don't want to be like Sally") and to start thinking 
about ways of achieving it. 
Perhaps I am glossing over some different levels of sophistication here. It is one thing 
to note that Sally believes that the sweets are in the drawer, when they are, and to note 
that that Ugh-Ugh believes the tiger is in the cave, when it is, and so on, and similarly 
to note that Jane believes the cake is in the cupboard, when it isn't, and that Kargh 
believes the snake is in the hole, when it isn't, and so on. It is perhaps a further step to 
classify all the former beliefs together, as true, and all the latter together, as false. 
Maybe so. Still, it doesn't seem all that big a step. In the rest of this paper, after this 
subsection, I shall accordingly assume that our ancestors were able to take this 
generalizing step, and think of truth and falsity as such. After all, human beings 
clearly came to grasp these notions at some stage, even if not immediately upon 
acquiring theory of mind. Moreover, this assumption will allow me to by-pass a 
number of unimportant complexities. 
Still, it will be worth digressing briefly in the rest of this subsection, to note that 
general notions of truth and falsity may not themselves be required for the sort of 
deliberate attempt to improve epistemic rationality that I am interested in. In this 
paper I have been talking about "reliability-for-truth" as such, because I have been 
considering the epistemic goodness of belief-forming methods from a general point of 
view, abstracting from any particular features to do with particular subject matters. 
However, particular epistemic agents concerned to improve themselves do not have to 
aim for truth in the abstract. Instead they might simply want the answers to specific 
questions. 
Thus they may want to know whether the tiger is in the tree, or more generally where 
it is, or perhaps how many tigers are in that copse. "Whether" ("where", "how 
many", . . .) here point to disjunctive aims which are undisputably available to any 
being with a theory of mind, even if the more abstract aim of truth requires some extra 
sophistication. Thus, to want to know whether the tiger is in the tree is to want that: 
you believe the tiger is in the tree, and it is, or that you believe it is not in the tree, and 
it is not. (Similarly, to want to know the whereabouts of the tiger comes to wanting: 
you believe it is in the tree, and it is in the tree, or you believe that it is in the cave, 
and it is in the cave, or . . . ; and, again, to want to know how many is to want that: 
you believe there is one, and there is one, or you believe there is two, and there are 
two, or . . .) 
Philosophers familiar with redundancy-style accounts of truth may note here how 
wanting to know "whether" the tiger is in the tree ("where", "how many", . . .) is 
rather like aiming for a restricted kind of redundancy truth (truth-in-L, where L is 
restricted to terms for talking about the tiger and the tree). But, whether or not we take 
this notion of restricted truth seriously, it is clear enough that any being who can pass 
the false belief test can set itself the aim of finding out whether such-and-such (or set 
itself "where" aims, or "how many" aims, . . .) Moreover, if it can devise a strategy for 
achieving these aims, then it will de facto have devised a strategy to bring it about that 
it gains true beliefs and avoids false ones. This would be quite enough for the 
deliberate improvement of epistemic rationality I am interested in. Whether these 
epistemic agents also think of themselves as aiming to gain truth and avoid falsity is 
an optional extra. The important point is that the strategies they devise to achieve their 
aims will in fact improve their reliability-for-truth on certain matters, whether or not 
they explictly think of it in these terms. (10)
8 Means-End Reasoning
Let me now turn to what I regard as the more difficult issue, the availability of means-
ends reasoning to human beings. The notion of means-end thinking is so familiar that 
it may seem as if there can be no problem here. Isn't it obvious that humans often 
figure out which possible actions are the best means to their ends? Indeed, isn't it 
obvious that this is true of many animals too? Given this, surely there is no special
biological puzzle about humans applying means-end thinking to the specific task of 
improving their reliability for truth. Aren't they just deploying an ability which 
emerged fairly early in evolutionary history, and which can therefore be taken for 
granted when we are trying to identify features which differentiate humans from other 
animals? 
But I don't think we should take means-end thinking for granted in this way. I take it 
to be a genuinely open question whether non-human animals really perform means-
end reasoning. Indeed I take there to be serious questions about the extent to which 
even humans do this. Of course, much hinges here on exactly what is required for 
"really performing means-end reasoning". But the issue is by no means solely a 
definitional one. However we resolve the definitional question, there will still remain 
relevant issues about which cognitive mechanisms are responsible for which 
behaviours in which animals, and about the emergence of these mechanisms in the 
course of evolution. 
The best way to bring out these issues is to describe a cognitive system which lacks 
any component designed to perform what I am thinking of as "means-end reasoning". 
No doubt the model I am about to elaborate is a caricature of any serious cognitive 
system. Even so, it will help to focus the issues. In particular, it will be easier to 
address definitional matters once this model is on the table. 
Imagine a cognitive system with a number of input modules designed to extract 
information about the particular circumstances of the organism. These could range 
from sensory systems designed to identify environmental features and identify 
physical objects, to more specialized systems for recognizing animals and plants, or 
indeed to systems for recognizing faces and detecting cheats. Some of these input 
modules would receive information from others. Perhaps some of them would also lay 
down their findings in memory stores. 
Now suppose also that there is a battery of output modules which generate certain 
kinds of behaviour when triggered. These behaviours might again range from the 
relatively unspecific, such as reaching or walking, to more specific activities like 
making a sandwich or driving to work, or indeed to greeting a friend or chastising a 
cheat. Maybe there is some nesting of these output modules, with some more 
complicated modules being built up from simpler ones. The execution of most output 
modules will also need to be guided by real-time informational resources, which may 
derive either from special informational channels dedicated to that output module, or 
from the above-mentioned input modules. 
Suppose also some system of links between the input modules and the output modules. 
These links will determine which output modules should be triggered, on the basis of 
the deliverances of the input modules, and perhaps also on the basis of information 
about levels of current needs. Maybe these links also play a role on determining 
activity in the input modules, directing them to process information when it is needed 
by output modules or is relevant to the triggering of output modules. 
Now, I could continue adding a number of obvious bells and whistles to this basic 
picture. But they would not affect one crucial point, namely, that there is no place in 
this cognitive architecture where representations of general or causal or conditional
facts play a role. As I am telling the story, the function of the input modules is to 
deliver more or less recondite particular facts about the organism's present and past 
environment, and to make them available to the linking system and output modules. 
But so far I have postulated nothing whose job is to identify facts of the form 
whenever A then B or A causes B or if A then B. 
Now, there is of course a sense in which some general-conditional facts of this form 
are already implicit in the architecture of our cognitive system. When the visual object 
recognition module moves from fragmentary retinal data to the judgement edge of a 
localized body, it is in effect proceding on the highly contingent assumption that 
whenever those data, there is an edge. Since this assumption has nearly always been 
true in our ancestral environments, natural selection will have favoured cognitiuve 
modules which make this inferential move. In this sense the inferential structure of the 
object recognition module will embody general information acquired in the course of 
evolution. The same point applies to output modules. Your disposition to exert your 
leg muscles a certain way when climbing up a hill can be viewed as embodying the 
general-conditional information this exertion will carry me so high. And the same 
point also applies, even more obviously, to the links between input and output 
modules. If a fruit-eating organism is disposed to shake a certain kind of tree 
whenever it is hungry, this disposition can in the same sense be said to embody the 
general-conditional information that shaking those trees will yield fruit. (11)
However, while such general-conditional information will in this sense be implicit in 
various parts of the postulated architecture, there is no one place where it is brought 
together and reasoned with. Thus, to make the point graphic, an organism may have 
something like shaking those trees will yield fruit implicit in one set of links, and 
something like throwing missiles will repel bears implicit in another, and yet no way 
of putting these together so as to figure out that it would be a good idea to shake a tree 
when a bear is prowling nearby and no missiles are yet to hand. Of course, this 
information may itself come to be embodied implictly in some disposition, if natural 
selection instils a specific disposition to shake trees to get fruit to throw at bears. But 
the general point will still apply. While the organism will have various bits of general-
conditional information implict in its various modules and the links between them, it 
will have no system for combining them and using them to infer the worth of 
behaviour that is not already directed by its cognitive architecture. 
Nor is this crucial point affected by the existence of learning during the course of 
individual development. Suppose I now add that the modules and their interlinkages 
are shaped during the course of individual development. The precise structure of each 
individual's walking module might depend on which behaviours produced successful 
walking in the individual's past, particularly during infancy. The judgements issuing 
from the object recognition module will perhaps depend in part on which cues have, 
via independent checks in the individual's past, proved to indicate physical objects. 
The links between the input and output modules can depend on which outputs have 
produced relevant reinforcing results in the past. Possibly we might even wish to 
speak of whole modules being grown, so to speak, in response to environmental 
encouragement. 
Learning in this sense will mean that a lot more general-conditional information will 
be embodied in various parts of the cogntive architecture. Wherever some 
architectural element is present because, in the individual's past, activity A was found 
to lead to reinforcing event B, then that element can be said to embody the general-
conditional information that if A then B. But the earlier point still applies. All these 
items of general-conditional information are still embodied in the specific dispositions 
of various parts of the architecture to make various moves given various conditions, 
and there is still nowhere where these items of information can be put together to 
draw inferences about the worth of new kinds of behaviour. 
Let me stipulate that a creature as so far decribed is "unthinking", in that it does no 
"means-end reasoning". I presuppose nothing here about what others may intend by 
the phrase "means-end reasoning". From now on I shall mean: a cognitive mechanism 
where different items of general-conditional information are brought together and 
used to select behaviour. Still, in defence of this usage, note that any practical 
reasoning worth the name will involve the individual's ability to infer general-
conditional facts of the form in circumstances C, action A will lead to desired result R
from a number of other general-conditional facts. In particular, it will be able to do 
this even though neither the individual nor its ancestors have ever previously 
experienced A leading to R in C. 
Now, even unthinking creatures will certainly be able to display a wide range of 
sophisticated behaviours, despite their lack of means-end reasoning. Nothing stops 
such creatures from being sensitive to the most intricate features of their environment 
and performing extremely complex routines under the guidance of this information. 
Morever, their informational sensitivity and behavioural complexity can be moulded 
by learning to fit the particular features of their individual environments. 
Given this, it is no straightforward matter to decide which, if any, non-human 
creatures might be performing means-end reasoning. This is of course an empirical 
matter, about which I shall have things to say in the next section. But it is certainly 
not to be taken for granted that sophisticated animal behaviour requires anything more 
than unthinking cognition. 
It is interesting, indeed, to consider how much human behaviour might be explained 
on a unthinking basis. I suspect that a great deal of human behaviour depends on 
nothing but cognitive mechanisms we share with unthinking creatures. Moreover, I 
shall suggest in section 10 that even means-end reasoning itself shouldn't be thought 
of as something that transforms all human cognition, but simply as an appendage 
hooked on to the side of a pre-existing unthinking architecture, as it were. 
Still, it seems clear that humans do have the ability to perform means-end reasoning 
in the sense I have specified. Humans don't always think carefully about their actions, 
but nearly all of them do this sometimes, and select actions on that basis. After all, 
there are many examples of human actions which clearly depend on our ability to 
infer the efficacy of some novel action from the mass of general-conditional 
information in our possession. How else could we know in advance that a rocket of a 
certain construction will go to the moon? Or, to pick a related example which bears 
directly on the overall topic of this paper, how else could we know in advance that a 
computer programmed in a certain way will deliver the right answers to a certain 
range of questions? 
A full understanding of human cognition thus requires us to recognize the existence of 
human means-end reasoning, and to account for the evolutionary emergence of this 
ability. It is somewhat surprising that this topic has received so little attention in 
recent discussions by philosophers and psychologists, by comparison with the vast 
recent literature on understanding of mind, and the widespread debate, over a rather 
longer timescale, of human language. This is especially surprising in view of the fact 
that much of this discussion of language, and of understanding of mind, takes human 
means-end reasoning for granted in explaining the structure and function of these 
other abilities. 
9 The Evolution of Means-End Reasoning
I am taking it to be uncontroversial that human beings are able to do means-end 
reasoning in my sense of inferentially processing explicit representations of general-
conditional facts, even if it is an open question whether other animals can. How 
exactly humans do this, however, and what evolutionarily evolved abilities they 
deploy, are further questions, on which I have avoided committing myself so far. 
We can compare two extreme views about the evolutionary underpinnings of means-
end rationality. At one end of the spectrum is the view that there is some complex and 
separate faculty in the brain, devoted exclusively to means-end reasoning, and which 
was selected specifically for that purpose. At the other is the view that means-ends 
reasoning is a "spandrel", which rests on other abilities, but which has been of no 
evolutionary significance itself. 
I think that both these views are unlikely, and that the truth lies somewhere in 
between. Let me start with the latter extreme. On this view, means-end reasoning 
would be like arithmetic or music. Proficiency at these practices may well have 
yielded a reproductive advantage in the period since they emerged, in the sense that 
adepts may have had more children on average. But we wouldn't on this account want 
to view these practices as evolutionary adaptations. Other abilities, with independent 
evolutionary explanations, fully enable us to explain the emergence and preservation 
of arithmetic and music, once they get into our culture (12). And in any case there 
probably hasn't been enough time since these practices started for any selection of 
genes favouring them to be selected. 
On this model, then, means-end reasoning would rest on other abilities with a 
biological purpose, but would have no such purpose itself. The most popular 
candidate for this enabling role is language, with understanding of mind also having 
some support from current fashion. Once our "language organ" had emerged (or, 
alternatively, our "understanding of mind module") then, so the story goes, we would 
have had the intellectual wherewithal for means-end reasoning, along with other 
cultural spin-offs like verbal agreements and fictional narratives. (13)
I find this extreme "spandrel" view quite implausible, for the following general reason. 
Means-end reasoning needs to issue in behaviour. However, unthinking cognitive 
architectures, of the kind outlined in the last section, have no place for anything to 
issue in behaviour except hard-wired or conditioned links leading from input modules 
and need indicators to output modules. Somehow means-end reasoning has to be able 
to set up new links to output modules (either temporary -- "next time I see a post box 
I'll insert this letter", or permanent -- "from now I'll eat fish instead of meat"). Without 
being able to alter our behaviour-guiding programme in this way, means-end 
reasoning wouldn't make any difference to what we do. 
However, it is difficult to see how a new power to alter behaviour could be a purely 
cultural matter. It scarcely makes sense to suppose that cultural innovation alone 
could intervene in some unprecendented way in the biological systems that direct 
action. Prior to means-end reasoning, behaviour is controlled by a set of dispositions 
that are laid down either by genes or by conditioning. Somehow means-end reasoning, 
however it is realised, involves the power to create new such dispositions. So there 
must have been some biological selection for this aspect of means-end reasoning at 
least, some alteration of our biological design which allowed the output of 
deliberative decisions to reset our dispositions to action. (14)
To say this is not yet to go to the other extreme of the spectrum from the beginning of 
this section, and postulate a complex purpose-built faculty which evolved specifically 
to do means-end reasoning. Indeed it is consistent with the point just made to suppose 
that the evolution of means-end reasoning depended heavily on the emergence of 
either language or understanding of mind. Maybe language or understanding of mind 
emerged first, and then a small genetic alteration allowed certain kinds of processing 
within these faculties to affect dispositions to behaviour. This would mean that 
means-end reasoning wasn't entirely spandrel-like, in line with the point just made, 
but it would still make it largely derivative from language or understanding of mind. 
I have some more specific worries about this kind of suggestion. To take 
understanding of mind first, the problem is that this faculty seems to presuppose
means-end reasoning. Even though this point often goes unremarked, the standard 
explanations of understanding of mind simply help themselves to the idea that "mind-
readers" are already capable of making inferences from general-conditional claims. 
This applies to both the standard stories, the "theory-theory" which holds that 
understanding of mind derives from an articulated theory of mind, and the 
"simulation-theory" which holds that it rests largely on the ability to simulate the 
mental processes of others. After all, the "theory-theory" explictly makes 
understanding of mind a special case of our ability to reason with general facts. And 
the "simulation-theory" holds that we anticipate others' decisions by mimicking their 
means-end reasoning "off-line", which presumably presupposes a prior ability to 
perform means-end reasoning on-line. 
As to the idea that language was the crucial precursor, here too it is arguable, if not so 
conclusively, that means-end reasoning must come before language, rather than the 
other way round. The thought here would be that the primary biological purpose of 
language is to increase each individual's stock of information. But such extra 
information wouldn't be any use to creatures who can't yet do means-end reasoning, 
since they wouldn't be able to use it to draw any extra conclusions about appropriate 
behaviour. 
But this is perhaps too quick. Maybe language first evolved as a device for passing 
around pieces of particular information ("a tiger is coming", "there are fruit in that 
tree", . . .). Since even creatures with unthinking cognitive architectures are guided by 
particular information about their circumstances, the utilty of this information doesn't 
yet call for any means-end reasoning. So maybe means-end reasoning only emerged 
after our ancestors had first developed a relatively sophisticated language for 
reporting particular facts. Building on this basis, perhaps language then evolved to 
report and process general-conditional claims, together with some corresponding 
alteration in the system that sets our behavioural dispositions, to allow the results of 
such processing of general-conditional claims to make a behavioural difference. 
I have no definite objections to this last language-based model for the emergence of 
means-end reasoning. But I am equally open to the idea that means-end reasoning 
may have emerged prior to and independently of any evolution of specifically 
hominid language. 
Of course, it is not to be denied that once language, and (indeed understanding of 
mind), did evolve, then this would have vastly augmented any pre-existing means-end 
abilities. Indeed we should expect there to have been significant co-evolution here, 
with preexisting means-end abilities undergoing further biological evolution once 
they received extra input from language and understanding of mind, and these latter 
faculties similarly being biologically encouraged because of the assistance they thus 
provided to means-end reasoning. 
Even so, it seems entirely plausible to me that there should have been at least some 
level of means-end reasoning in creatures who lack any hominid-type language. After 
all, there seems to be a huge gulf between purely unthinking creatures, as defined in 
the last section, and creatures who can converse about general-conditional facts. This 
should make us wonder whether there are some elementary kinds of means-end 
reasoning in creatures who lack language. Maybe some pre-lingusitic creatures 
developed ways of drawing on general-conditional information to set new dispositions 
to behaviour. (This of course might make it easier to understand how linguistic 
reasoning could acquire the power to affect behaviour: maybe it routes its influence 
via this more primitive kind of means-end reasoning, whatever that might be.) 
At this point we need more empirical information about non-human creatures. There 
are surprisingly few data in this area. Some work has been done on the ability of apes 
and other primates to appreciate the causal connections between items in their 
environment (Tomasello and Call, 1997, chs 3 and 12). This experimental evidence is 
not clear-cut. While apes can certainly learn to use tools in novel ways, they don't 
seem to represent the causal connection between the tool and the result in a way that 
can inform means-end reasoning. Experts doubt whether information about the 
connection between some intermediary cause and some end result ever allows non-
human primates "to devise novel ways of producing the intermediary and thus the end 
result" (op cit., p. 390). 
A rather different tradition of research has investigated whether rats can put together 
separate pieces of information to infer the worth of novel actions. Anthony Dickinson 
and his associates have argued that they can, on the basis of experiments like the 
following. Take a rat which is hungry, but not thirsty, and teach it that pressing a bar 
will produce dry food pellets, while pressing a lever will produce a sucrose solution 
(which also satsifies hunger). Now make it thirsty, but not hungry. Will it now press 
the lever, rather than the bar, even though its thirst, as opposed to its hunger, has 
never been satisfied by the sucrose solution? 
The answer is yes -- provided that the rat has at some previous time been shown that 
the sucrose solution is a better satisfier of thirst than the dry food pellets (Heyes and 
Dickinson, 1990; Dickinson and Balleine, 1999). And at first sight this does look like 
a bit of means-end reasoning. The rat seems to be putting together the information 
that (a) lever-pressing yields the sucrose solution with (b) the sucrose solution 
satisfies thirst, to infer the conclusion (c) that lever-pressing will satisfy thirst. 
This is certainly interesting, but there is room to query whether it indicates genuine 
means-end reasoning. Maybe the role of the earlier exposure to the thirst-satisfying 
effects of the sucrose solution is not to instil knowledge of this casual connection in 
the rat, but rather to give it a new acquired "need", namely, for sucrose solution as 
such. This possibility is supported by other experiments of Dickinson's, which suggest 
that such "incentive learning" would not be quashed even if the rat's later experience 
indicated that the sucrose solution did not satisfy thirst after all. If this is right, and the 
rat has come to value the sucrose solution in itself, then its behaviour can be explained 
without supposing it is putting together different pieces of general-conditional 
information. Rather its new need for sucrose solution is simply triggering its 
disposition to press the lever when it needs sucrose solution. Still, there remains the 
fact that the rat seems to have acquired this disposition, to press the lever when it 
needs sucrose solution, even though it has not been so rewarded for pressing the lever, 
and this itself is worthy of remark. 
This kind of neo-associationist research raises any number of fascinating questions, 
but this is not the place to pursue details. Let me conclude this foray into empirical 
speculation by considering a rather different kind of basis for means-end reasoning. 
So far I have not raised the issue of how far means-end reasoning needs to be 
"domain-general" rather than "domain-specific". When we think of mature human 
means-end reasoning, we automatically think of a faculty which is capable of dealing 
with information on pretty much any subject matter. But there is nothing in my 
definition of means-end reasoning as such to require such domain-generality. All I 
specified was a system that can put together different items of general-conditional 
information to draw conclusions about the worth of novel actions. This is perfectly 
consistent with the system doing this only with information of a quite specific kind. 
This points to the possibility of creatures who evolve a domain-specific form of 
means-end reasoning, which deals with limited kinds of information and informs 
specific kinds of actions. One obvious example would be spatial reasoning. Research 
on rats an other mammals indicates that they can use representations of their spatial 
environment to figure out which of various possible actions will comprise the solution 
to some novel spatial problem, such as finding their way through a simple maze. 
Despite the domain-specificity of this ability, it satisfies my definition of means-end 
reasoning, in that such creatures effectively have a wealth of information about what 
will happen if they move in various ways, which they can use in combination to figure 
out what to do in novel situations. 
Perhaps some domain-specific reasoning of this proto-means-end kind will provide a 
missing link between unthinking animals and full-fledged human means-end 
reasoners. On this suggestion, spatial reasoning or something similar would have 
come first, and then this would then have been further adapated to allow reasoning 
over a wider range of subect matters. The tendency of humans to represent intellectual 
problems in geoemetrical terms is suggestive in this context. Another aspect of human 
reasoning that may repay further research is the use of visual imagination to anticipate 
the results of possible actions. 
10 Means-End Reasoning and Theoretical Rationality
Let me now return to theoretical rationality. Recall that I argued, in response to the 
"explanatory problem", that humans can avoid doxastic error by deliberately aiming 
to improve their reliability-for-truth. However, I have yet to address the question, 
which I flagged in section 6, about how this deliberate pursuit of truth is supposed to 
co-exist with older "quick and dirty" methods of belief-formation. 
On the face of it, there certainly seems to be a problem here. If humans are innately 
predisposed to use certain "quick and dirty" mechanisms to deliver answers when 
faced with certain problems, then how is it possible for them deliberately to stop these 
mechanisms operating? After all, it is a familiar philosophical point that our doxastic 
behaviour is not under the control of our will. So we might expect the automatic, 
older mechanisms to continue operating as before, even after we form the intention to 
improve our doxastic performance. But then, if this is right, it remains unclear how 
humans can improve their doxastic performance, given that the automatic 
mechanisms will continue to churn out the bad old answers as before. 
The discussion of means-end reasoning in the last two sections can help here. 
Consider first my overall picture of the relation between means-end reasoning and the 
rest of our cognitive architecture. It is no part of my thinking to suppose that, once 
humans are able to do means-end thinking, then this will somehow permeate all their 
cognition and transform it with some higher intelligence. On the contrary, I am 
supposing that nearly all our activities will continue to be driven as before, with fast 
and frugal modules processing information about our particular circumstances, and 
with output modules being triggered as opportunity arises and need demands. The 
means-end system is simply added on to the side of the existing unthinking 
architecture, as it were, leaving the rest as before. 
The only change we need postulate is that sometimes, when the stakes are high and 
time does not press, the means-end system will be prompted to identify the best 
course of action in the light of the general-conditional information available to it. This 
identification will then feed back into the pre-existing unthinking architecture, by 
setting new input-output links so as to trigger some particular output module when 
certain cues are next encountered. 
This model now gives us room to manoeuvre on the issue of whether it is in our 
power to improve our doxastic performance, given that the hard-wired and automatic 
belief-forming "modules" threaten to force beliefs on us willy-nilly. As a first step,
note that a decision to improve doxastic performance in such-and-such circumstances 
("do the sums, don't just guess") is itself a special case of an output of means end-
reasoning. Our general-conditional information implies that, if we want to avoid error, 
we had better do the sums, or whatever, and our desire to avoid error then leads us to 
set certain dispositions to action accordingly. We set ourselves to perform a certain 
sequence of actions (mental arithmetic, paper and pencil calculations, . . .) whenever 
we are triggered by the relevant problem situations (problems involving probabilities, 
logic, arithemetic, . . .). 
If we look at it in this way, there is no suggestion that the new belief-forming methods 
need somehow replace or abolish the old fast and frugal modules. There are some 
interesting issues here, but the simplest assumption will be that the old modules will 
continue to run, quickly and frugally, alongside the improved belief-forming methods 
which we are now disposed to follow when triggered by the relevant problems. 
This means that in certain cases, the ones where the fast and frugal methods go astray, 
we will in a sense "end up" with two conflicting answers. The fast modules will 
continue to "tell us" that it is likely that Linda is a feminist bank teller, and that we 
have cancer, and that we needn't turn over the odd number, even while the deliberate 
methods deliver the contrary answers. 
Described like that, it may sound weird, but I think that it is quite faithful to the facts. 
Consider the familiar case of knowingly experienced visual illusions. The Muller-
Lyer lines are the classic example. The two lines look different lengths to you, and 
moreover continue to do so even when you know they are the same length. There is 
an obvious modular explanation for this phenomenon. We have a fast and frugal 
object identification module, which delivers the conclusion that the lines are different 
lengths. We also have more deliberate and accurate ways of deciding the question, 
using measurements, which delivers the conclusion they are the same length. 
Deciding the question the deliberate way does not block the operation of the fast 
module, which is why the illusion persists even when you know it is an illusion. 
As with the visual example, so in the more general case. Don't we continue to "feel 
the pull" of the judgements that Linda is a feminist bank teller, that we have cancer, 
and that we needn't turn over the odd number, even when our more deliberate 
reasoning gives us the contrary answers? I would say that this is because our hard-
wired modules are still generating their erroneous answers, alongside the more 
deliberate belief-forming processes that deliver the right ones. We know the quick 
answers are "cognitive illusions", but our hard-wired modules continue to press them 
upon us. 
There may still seem to be a problem. If I am now saying we don't in fact block the 
bad old modules when we decide to use better belief-forming methods, since the old 
modules are still running, then in what sense can I claim that we succeed in giving 
ourselves the new improved beliefs? After all, I have just insisted that the old modules 
continue to press their bad answers on us, while the new methods give us the contrary 
claims. So won't we end up with self-cancelling contradictions, rather than 
unequivocally improved new beliefs? 
Here we need to distinguish between the different uses of module-driven and 
deliberate judgements, in addition to distinguishing their sources. The language of 
"belief" starts to break down at this point. Consider the vision case again. Do I 
"believe" that the lines are different lengths or not, when I "knowingly experience" 
the Muller-Lyer illusion? Yes and no. Certain parts of my behaviour will be driven by 
the judgement that they are different lengths, as when I am asked to point quickly and 
without warning to the longer. But other behaviour, such as betting a large sum on 
their lengths, will be driven by the deliberative judgement that they are the same 
length. Similarly, I would suggest, with the other cognitive illusions. When we have 
to act in a hurry, our behaviour will standardly be driven by the fast illusory 
judgements. When we have time to think about what to do, we act on the basis of the 
deliberative judgements. 
So the different sources of the two kinds of judgements are mirrored by the different 
uses to which they are put. At a first pass, we can expect that the fast module-derived 
judgements will continue to drive behavioural routines that are tied to those 
judgements by hard-wider or conditioned links, even when deliberation indicates that 
those judgements are illusory. By contrast, deliberative judgements will be 
distinguished, not just by being outputs of the means-end system, but also by 
providing distinctive inputs to that system. The main roles of deliberative judgements 
will be to feed further information back into the means-end system, and thus to 
improve future means-end decision-making. Of course, the means-end system will 
also acquire many judgements via the old fast modules, in cases where we have no 
reason to distrust those modules. But judgements issuing from the deliberate pursuit 
of truth will play a dominant means-end role, in that they will override doubtful 
modular judgements, within the means-end system at least, when there is any conflict. 
11 Knowledge-Seeking and Biological Design
So far I have simply presented our ability to achieve high levels of theoretical 
rationality as a spandrel. While I argued in the section before last that means-end 
reasoning in general must involve some genetic evolution (if only to explain how it 
has the power to influence behaviour), I have not claimed this about the deliberate 
pursuit of truth. If you can identify the end of truth (from your understanding of mind), 
and if you can figure out which strategies are the best means to this end (from your 
means-end system), then you will therewith have the ability to adopt reliable belief-
forming methods in pursuit of true beliefs, without any further biological evolution 
needed. 
In this section, however, I want to consider whether there has been any biological 
selection for truth-seeking itself. Have certain genes been favoured specifically 
because they make us better at seeking out reliable belief-forming processes? 
One reason for pursuing this thought is that there has been a gap in my story so far. I 
have spoken of identifying the end of truth, and have argued that this falls out of 
theory of mind. But note that what falls out of theory of mind is the concept of truth, 
if anything, not a desire for truth. To be able to think about truth isn't yet to want truth, 
but it is only wanting truth that will make you seek reliable belief-forming processes. 
Why might people seek truth? One reason has been implict in much of the argument 
so far, but has not yet been explicitly mentioned. If you act on true beliefs, you will 
generally get the results you want, but not if you act on false beliefs. So people who 
reflect on what's generally needed to satisfy their desires, and figure out that they need 
to act on true beliefs to be confident of this, will want truth as a means to satisfying 
their desires. 
But this is rather a lot of reasoning to ask of our rather dull ancestors. They would 
need to start thinking about their aims, and about the general connection between 
possessing true beliefs and success in achieving what they want. Perhaps this 
connection will fall out of the theory of mind (it would be interesting to test small 
children on this), but it is not obvious that it should do so. 
So, if it was not manifest to our ancestors that they needed true beliefs to succeed in 
action, then they may have had means-end thinking in general, yet mightn't have 
sought truth via reliable methods, for lack of thinking through the reasons for wanting 
truth as a means. 
Still, it seems clear that they would have been much more successful the more true 
beliefs they were able to feed into their means-end system. So any gene that made 
them desire truth in itself would have been strongly favoured by natural selection.
Note that this would just be a special case of the logic by which natural selection 
makes us desire anything. There is a perspective from which it can seem puzzling that 
natural selection has designed us to desire anything except reproductive success. After 
all, natural selection favours traits just to the extent that they contribute to 
reproductive success. So why should it be a biologically good idea to design us to 
pursue proximate goals like food and warmth and sex, rather than reproductive 
success itself? Why not just set us the single aim of reproductive success, and leave it 
to us to figure out how best to achieve it? 
The answer, of course, is that the relevant connections are often obscure, if not to us, 
then certainly to our ancestors. Natural selection couldn't trust our ancestors, so to 
speak, always to identify the best means to reproductive success. So instead it set 
them some more immediate goals, like food, warmth and sex, and which had 
correlated reasonably well with eventual reproductive success in the evolutionary past, 
and which were immediate enough for our ancestors to figure out effectively how to 
pursue them. 
Similarly, I would like to suggest, with truth. True beliefs will correlate well with 
reproductive success (since they will correlate with desire satisfaction which 
correlates with reproductive success). But if our ancestors were unable to discern this 
connection (or more to the point, discern the connection with desire satisfaction, given 
that evolution had already set them to pursue various proximate goals, rather than 
reproductive success per se), then it would have been greatly to their biological 
advantage to be instilled with a desire for truth per se. Then they would have pursued 
truth in any case, whether or not they saw the connection with further success in 
action, and so reaped the rewards of such further success as a side-effect (intended by 
evolution, so to speak, but not by themselves). 
One obvious piece of evidence in support of this conjecture is the natural tendency of 
many human beings to seek out the truth on matters of no obvious practical concern. 
Consider investigations into the origin of the universe, or the evolution of species, or 
abstract metaphysics. It is not obvious, to they the least, how these investigations 
might be motivated by the thought that true beliefs will enable us to succeed in our 
practical projects. Of course, the tendency towards such research might due to culture 
rather than any genetic selection. But we should not rule out the possibility that such 
pure research owes its existence to the fact that natural selection couldn't trust us to 
tell when the truth was going to be useful to reproductive success, and so made us 
seek it willy-nilly. 
How seriously should we take talk of evolution selecting certain desires? This 
depends in part on how we understand desire talk. For most of the past few sections I 
have avoided "belief" and "desire" talk, because of philosophical controversies 
surrounding its interpretation. But in this section I have not been able to resist the 
expository convenience. Let me now make this talk of "desires" good by explaining 
that I mean nothing but the preferences revealed by means-end thinking. This notion 
was already implicit in my earlier discussion of a means-end system, which after all is 
a system which takes in beliefs, figures out what they imply for the consequences of 
the various actions available, and then selects one such option. Such a system, by its 
nature, favours certain consequences over others, and so to this extent can be said to 
embody a "desire" for those consequences. This is all I mean when I say that natural 
selection may have instilled a "desire" for truth in us. All I mean is that natural 
selection did something which increased the likelihood of our means-end reasoners 
selecting actions which it took would yield true beliefs. 
At this stage it will be useful to make a rather different point about genetic selection 
for a trait like desiring the truth. So far I have presented this as an alternative to the 
view that the pursuit of truth was invented by some stone-age decision theorist, some 
prehistoric genius who saw for the first time that people who had true beliefs would 
generally be better at achieving their ends. But in fact the two possibilities are not in 
conflict, and indeed the invention scenario adds hugely to the plausibility of the 
genetic story. 
Suppose, for the sake of the argument, that some prehistoric ancestor did first see that 
it would be useful to get at the truth. Perhaps the idea spread some way, to the family 
of the immediate inventor, or to his or her hunter-gatherer band. This would be a 
wonderfully useful practice, and those who cottoned on to it would fare well. Indeed 
those who cottoned on to it quickly would be at a huge reproductive advantage. So 
there would be immense selective pressure in favour of any genetically-based quirks 
of cognitive development which aided the acquisition of this trick. 
One way to achieve this would be to jiggle the development of the means-end system 
slightly, in such a way as to make it more likely to acquire a preference for truth when
the surrounding culture sets an example. It seems independently plausible that our 
adult prefences should depend upon our developmental experience, yielding derived
preferences for things which in our experience have led to reinforcing results (cf. the 
discussion of Dickinson's rats in section 9). And it is also independently plausible that 
surrounding cultural practices will influence which such derived preferences get set 
up. Now, when some such culturally influenced derived preference is also 
biologically advantageous, then natural selection is likely to come to the aid of the 
party too, by favouring genes that make it easier for this particular preference to be 
acquired. This genetic alteration needn't be advantageous in the absence of the 
surrounding culture. It may not be selectively positive when, in the absence of a 
supporting culture, there is no real chance of developing a preference for truth. Yet, if 
such a genetic alteration were selected within the context of a surrounding culture, 
then this would still constitute selection of a desire for truth, in the sense I intend. For 
certain genes would have been favoured because they increased the likelihood that the 
means-end system would select actions which promised to yield true beliefs. 
It is important not to think of all biological selection as requiring complexes of genes 
which on their own specify elaborate end-products, in the way an architect's drawings 
specify a building. All an advantageous allele need do is increase the likelihood that 
some advantageous trait will develop in the normal range of environments. Indeed all 
genes will depend on some features of the environment to help bring about the effects 
for which they are selected. In the special case of organisms with cultures, the features 
of the environment which might combine with the gene to help produce the 
advantageous effects might be very complex and specific. The gene "in itself", so to 
speak, might have no obvious connection with a desire for truth, to return to our 
example, except that it causes some non-specific change in the brain that happens to 
make you better at learning to pursue the truth when others in your society are already 
setting an example and enocuraging you to follow it. But once there is a culture with 
this last-mentioned feature, then this gene will be strongly selected for. (What is more, 
once it is selected for, then there will be scope for more elaborate developments of the 
cultural practice, since everybody has now become better at cottoning on to it, which 
will create extra pressure for genes which make you good at learning the more 
elaborate practice . . .) 
Let me now conclude by briefly considering a rather different way in which natural 
selection may have favoured the pursuit of belief-forming strategies which are reliable 
for truth. Apart from fostering a desire for truth, it may also have given us an input 
module dedicated to the identification of reliable sources of belief. I do not intend this 
as an alternative to the hypothesis of a biologically enhanced desire for truth, but as 
something which may have occurred in addition. (Moreover, the points about culture-
gene interaction just made in connection with the desire for truth will also apply to the 
biological selection of an ability to identify reliable sources of belief. Let me now take 
this as read, without repeating the story.) 
This further suggestion should strike an immediate chord with philosophers. Anybody 
who has tangled with the baroque philosophical literature on the concept of 
knowledge will know that humans make unbelievably detailed and widely consistent 
judgements about which people count as knowers. They can judge, in a way that 
seems to escape any straightforward philosophical analysis in terms of necessary and 
sufficient conditions, whether true beliefs derived in all kinds of recherché ways are 
tightly enough linked to the facts to qualify as knowledge. I would like to suggest that 
these judgements issue from a biologically favoured input module whose task is to 
identify those routes to belief which can be trusted to deliver true beliefs. When we 
ask, "Does X really know about p?", or "Wouldn't we know whether p if went and 
examined those tracks carefully . . ?", we are arguably deploying an notion which has 
been designed to help us decide whether some route to the belief that p is a reliable 
source of truth. From this perspective, then, judgements about knowledge are the 
products of an input module which has been encouraged by natural selection because 
it yields a fast and frugal way of identifying strategies which are reliable for truth. 
Recall a point I made in section 4.1, that the everyday notion of "knowledge" focuses 
exclusively on reliability-for-truth, and abstracts from the cost or significance of the 
belief in question. The man knew how many blades of grass he had, even if he was 
wasting his time on a trivial matter. This bears on one common objection to my 
suggestion that biological evolution may have favoured truth-seeking as such. A 
number of colleagues have contended (standardly citing Peter Godfrey-Smith's 
"Signal, Detection, Action", 1991) that it is implausible that evolution should have 
encouraged the aim of truth as such. Since there are serious costs to a high degree of 
reliability, wouldn't we expect evolution to have balanced the worth of truth against 
the cost and significance of acquiring it? 
This is a reasonable point, but we should not forget that evolution isn't a perfect 
engineer, and often has to settle for less than the best. I conjecture that, once domain-
general means-end reasoning was up and running, it was so important that it be 
stocked with accurate information that evolution started selecting for truth-seeking per 
se, in abstraction from cost and significance. Maybe an even better cognitive design 
would have avoided ever making truth per se one of our doxastic aims, but only truth 
weighed by some mix of cost and significance. But my suspicion is that evolution 
couldn't take the risk, so to speak, that the pursuit of truth might be diluted in this way. 
(Compare: maybe it would be even better if sex as such were never one of our aims, 
but only sex that is likely to lead to healthy offspring; here too evolution has clearly 
found it better not to be too fancy.) 
I take the striking structure of the concept of knowledge to lend support to the idea 
that truth-seeking per se has been selectively advantageous in our biological history. 
This complex concept comes so easily to humans that it seems likely that there is 
some genetic component in its acquisition. Yet this concept focuses exclusively on 
reliability-for-truth, in abstraction from any other desiderata on belief-formation. If I 
am right to suggest that judgements about knowledge are the products of an input 
module which has been encouraged by natural selection, then this at least is one case 
where evolution has decided that the important thing is to get at the truth, whatever 
the cost or significance. 
A prediction follows from the hypothesis that judgements about knowledge are the 
products of an input module. On this hypothesis, we ought to suffer "cognitive 
illusions" with respect to judgements about knowledge. There should be situations 
where the quick but dirty module takes a view on whether some belief is or isn't 
"knowledge", but our more deliberate reasoning disagrees on whether this belief 
stems from a reliable source. 
I think there are cases just like this, and they will be familiar to philosophers. 
Consider the "intuitions" that are standardly thought to count against reliabilist 
theories of knowledge. These are precisely cases in which some true belief has been 
arrived at by a reliable process, and yet, in the immediate judgement of ordinary 
people, do not really qualify as "knowledge", or vice versa. I have no view (nor do I 
really care) whether this disqualifies reliabilism as a philosophical theory of 
knowledge. But it does fit the hypothesis of a dedicated module whose function is to 
identify reliable sources of belief. For, like all fast and frugal modules, it will cut 
some corners, and end up making some judgements it ought not to make. 
Philosophical epistemologists may wish to continue charting such mistakes in the 
pursuit of the everyday notion of knowledge. But naturalist philosophers of 
psychology will be happy to note how their existence perfectly confirms the 
hypothesis of a biological module dedicated to identifying reliable sources of truth. 
(15)
Footnotes
(1) Why isn't |4|, which many subjects choose, another appropriate answer? This answer mightn't be 
capable of falsifying the hypothesis, as |3| is but it does at least promise to add supoort by instantiating 
it. This is a reasonable point, but the fact remians that most subjects choose |4| instead of |3|. It may be 
appropraite to view |4| as an answer, but it is not appropriate to think that |3| isn't one.
(2) Is such a community really possible? Some philosophers might argue on a priori grounds that such 
irrationality would be inconsistent with the supposition that the community has beliefs. However, while 
some minimal degree of rationality is no doubt required to qualify as a believer, it seems very doubtful 
whether this standard is high enough to rule out the postulated community. (Cf. Cherniak, 1986).
(3) Perhaps a match between orthodox notions of rationality and actual human practice can be restored 
by focusing on "experts", rather than the general run of humans. The difficulty here, however, is to 
identify the experts in a non-question-begging way. (Cf. Nisbett and Stich, 1980).
(4) Note that for inferential methods the relevant notion is conditional reliability. Inferential methods 
needn't always deliver true conclusions, but they should deliver true conclusions if their premises are 
true.
(5) Even if "true" doesn't mean "rationally assertible", won't the suggested relaiabilist strategy for 
assessing rationality still lack practical teeth? For, when we assess the reliability of our belief-forming 
methods, how else can we check their outputs except by using those selfsame belief-forming methods? 
So won't we inevitably end up concluding our methods are reliable? Not necessarily. For one thing, 
there is plenty of room for some belief-forming methods to be discredited because their outputs do not 
tally with those of other methods. And, in any case, assessments of belief-forming methods don't 
always proceed by directly assessing the outputs of those methods, but often appeal to theoretical 
considerations instead, which creates even more room for us to figure out that our standard methods of 
belief-assessment are unreliable. (For example, when I judge that newspaper astrology columns are 
unreliable sources of truth, I don't draw this conclusion inductively from some survey showing that 
astrological predictions normally turn out false, but from general assumptions about causal influences. 
For more on this, see Papineau, 1987, ch 8.)
(6) This shows why, even given the complications introduced by different possible desiderata, my 
position on the evaluative question remains different from Cohen's. Where Cohen ties rationality to 
intuitions about rational thinking, I tie it to facts about which methods actually deliver which 
consequences. True, I have now in a sense admitted an element of relativism into judgements of "wide 
rationality", in that I have allowed that it can be an evaluator-relative matter which desiderata are to 
count. But this is not the kind of relativism for which I earlier criticised Cohen's position. I allow that 
people and communities can have good reasons for differing on which desiderata they want belief-
forming methods to satisfy. But it does not follow, as Cohen's position seems to imply, that whatever 
methods they practice will be rational for them if they take them to be rational. For there will remain 
the question of whether those methods actually deliver the desired consequences, and nobody's merely 
thinking this will make it so.
(7) The classic example of this approach is Cosmides' and Tooby's account of the Wason selection test 
(that is, puzzle (3) in section 2 above). They show that people are much better at this test when it is 
framed as a question about which individuals might be violating some social agreement, and they argue 
on this basis that the underlying abilities must be adaptations which are well-designed to detect social 
cheats. (See their contribution to Barklow, Cosmides, and Tooby, 1992)
(8) Jonathan Evans and David Over distinguish "personal rationality" ("rationality1") from "impersonal 
rationality" ("rationality 2") They characterise the former as "thinking ... or acting when ... sanctioned 
by a normative theory" (1996, p.8). It has been suggested to me, in various discussions, that this is 
similar to my distinction, between "quick and dirty" methods hard-wired by evolution, and 
sophisticated methods deliberately designed to achieve the truth. I disagree. Even if we restrict Evans' 
and Over's definitions to the subject area I am interested in, namely theoretical rationality, there remain 
crucial difereences. Their "personal rationality" is picked out as good for achieving personal goals. 
Some thinkers, especially those influenced by evolutionary psychology, may think this coincides with 
"quick and dirty" thinking , but I don't, since I believe that "quick and dirty thinking" often prevents us 
from achieving out goals in the modern world. Conversely, my sophisticated methods are themselves 
orientated to a particular personal goal, namely, the goal of true beliefs. For me, though not, it seems, 
for Evans and Over, any "normativity" attaching tio sophisticated methods is explained in terms of their 
being good routes to the personal goal of truth, and not in terms of some independent sense of 
normatively correctness. (Cf. Papineau, 1999)
(9) To guard against one possible source of confusion, let us distinguish between modern science, in 
the sense if the institution that has developed in Western Europe since the beginning of the seventeeth 
century, and the general enterprise of deliberately seeking true beliefs, which I take to have been part of 
human life since before the beginning of recorded history. While deliberately seeking true beliefs is 
certainly part of science, the distinctively modern institution clearly rests of the confluence of a number 
of other factors, including distrust of authority, the use of mathematics, and the expectation that 
simplicity lies behind the appearances.
(10) It is intersting to contrast truth with probability here. While we have had the intellectual resources 
to pursue truth for at least 100,000 years, and quite possibly a lot longer, the notion of probability has 
only been around since 1654. (Cf. Hacking, 1975). I think that this is why our culture encompasses 
many everyday techniques designed to help us to track the truth, but is very bad at teaching ordinary 
people to reason with probabilities. It is no accident that most of the "irrationality" experimnets trade in 
probabilities.
(11) There are many delicate questions about exactly how to chrarcterise contents in different kinds of 
cognitive systems, and in particular about whether the simple cognitive architecture so far warrants all 
the precise characterisations of content I have suggested. I shall gloss over this in this paper, as nothing 
much will hang on in. In Papineau (1997) I explain how the teleosemantic approache to content that I 
favour can deliver precise contents for full-fledged means-end reasoners, but suggest that nothing 
similar is justified or less sophisticated cognitive systems. I am no longer so pessimistic - I think there 
are cases and cases- but further work remains to be done.
(12) Which is not to deny that these explanations themselves can be informed by biological facts. 
Which practices are preserved by "culture" depends crucially on which dispositions have been 
bequeathed to us by natural selection. (Cf. Sperber, 1996)
(13) The line that "means-end reasoning is a spandrel" is found more often in conversation than in print. 
Still, it is popular among a surprisingly wide range of theorists, from official "evolutionary 
psychologists", through Dennettians, to neo-associationist experimentalists.
(14) Note how this model, in which means-end reasoning "resets" our dispositions to action, can easily 
accommodate plans, that is complicated sequences of actions needed to achieve some end. This would 
only require that the means-end system be able to produce mutiple action settings, settings which 
would trigger a sequence of behaviours as a sequence of cues were encountered (some of which might 
simply be the completion of previous behaviours). An interesting evolutionary step pushing humans 
down a different cognitive path from other mammals was the ability to learn complex sequences of 
action (an ability which could in turn be explained by tool use and other practices made possible by 
complex hnds). Once this ability to learn complex patterns was in place, then perhaps it became useful 
for our ancestors to start doing means-end thinking , in a way that it hadn't before, because then they 
could figure out and set themselves to perform complex plans. That is, maybe means-end thinking is 
only worth the trouble for animals who are already capable of learning complex behaviours, for only 
they will be able to devise complex plans.
(15) I would like to thank Peter Carruthers, Peter Goldie, David Over, Kim Sternly and Stephen Stich 
for comments on this paper.
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